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A survey of 2,800 Iranian youths regarding their consumption of media and social media indicates that the
Internet and state-run television are their primary source for news and information, followed by traditional
media and personal connections. Twitter, long thought to be the catalyst of the post-election discontent in
2009, did not show up on the radar of news and information sources.
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Abstract
The uprisings after the 2009 elections in Iran generated debate on new media’s potential 
to affect dissent in authoritarian countries. We surveyed 2800 young, educated, 
metropolitan, and technologically savvy Iranians over a year after the election and during 
the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa to examine what sources these youth 
use for information, the extent to which they rely on new media for political exchanges, 
their experiences with online censorship, and political efficacy as related to new media. 
Although the Internet was stated as the most important news outlet, state-controlled 
television was often used, and Twitter was the least prevalent new media platform. 
Personal issues and IT/science were more often discussed via new media than politics. 
Further, it was using new media, not talking politics online, that predicted the frequency 
with which respondents encountered blocked websites online and also perceptions of 
their ownpolitical efficacy. Although our findings may support voices that are skeptical 
about technology’s ability to sustain revolution, we also identify what can be described 
as hubs of politicized Iranian youth.
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The popular uprisings that followed the contested 2009 elections in Iran generated 
substantial discussion on the potential for new information and communication tech-
nologies to affect dissent and activist organization in authoritarian countries. The 
massive upheavals that unfolded and spread through the Middle East and North Africa 
in 2011 intensified the interest among scholars, the general public, and civil society 
advocates in how tools such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube are used for political 
strategizing and social mobilization.
Both in Iran and during the collective movements termed the “Arab Spring,” some 
reformist activists deployed new media to encourage compatriots to take to the streets, 
and there were spikes in online revolutionary conversations before major events on the 
ground (Howard et al., 2011). These observations contributed to the idea that new media 
played a central role in these events, a conviction that led to attractive monikers such as 
“Twitter/Facebook Revolutions.”
Other observers, however, were skeptical of claims that the uprisings in Iran and 
the “Arab Spring” were substantially strengthened by new communication technolo-
gies. Some stated that revolutions “will not be tweeted,” noting that blogs, Twitter, and 
Facebook were not used for widespread strategizing and organizing (Gladwell, 2010). 
These commentators observed that most Twitter feeds after the election originated 
outside Iran and reminded the public that the states themselves use new media as a 
means to target their perceived enemies and to advance in the so-called “soft war” 
(Morozov, 2011).
To some extent, the conclusions drawn depend on where one looks for evidence. An 
interview with an Iranian political blogger will lead one to conclude that blogs and social 
media facilitated mobilization. Similarly, analyzing political tweets (see Howard, 2009) 
will likely lead to overemphasis of the role played by Twitter in Iran and the greater 
Middle East (Hofheinz, 2011).
In this study, we update and extend this discussion, approaching it from a different 
angle. We rely on survey data from 2800 young Iranians recruited through an online 
file-sharing platform in early 2011 in order to shed light on the sources that Iranian 
youth use for information. We differentiate between traditional media, face-to-face 
talk, public spaces, and religious leaders, among other potential sources, and also pay 
particular attention to websites, blogs, Twitter, and text messages. We further examine 
the topics Iranian youth communicate about via new media to assess the relative preva-
lence of sociopolitical issues. Moreover, we test the extent of online censorship and of 
the likely use of circumvention tools, and also analyze whether online activities and 
experiences of online censorship affect the extent to which new media are linked with 
individual political efficacy.
This sample, which uses the Internet to a greater extent and at higher speeds than the 
general population and is technologically savvy, has a collective profile that could well 
characterize young activists during the uprisings in Iran in 2009, allowing us to exam-
ine whether and how Iranian youth employ new media for political purposes in Iran’s 
continually politicized environment. Examining these topics in 2011, over a year after 
the contested elections and during the uprisings in the greater Middle East, may shed 
some light on the claims regarding the extent to which people use Twitter or Facebook 
for political or revolutionary activity. Our study cannot speak to new media use before, 
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during, and directly after the contested Iranian election in 2009; nevertheless, one 
would hope that once engaged with politics on new media platforms, citizens would 
continue using these media for political exchanges, especially during the wide-scale 
mobilizing in the region and as sustained economic and political dissatisfaction contin-
ued to simmer in Iran (Howard, 2010).
Utopian, dystopian, realistic: new media after the 2009 
election in Iran
After the Iranian presidential elections in June 2009, thousands of people took to the 
streets in Tehran to protest what they believed was a victory stolen from reformist 
candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi by the incumbent, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The 
Iranian government reacted to these uprisings, now known as the Green Movement, by 
intimidating and arresting journalists and activists and seeking to prevent information 
reaching the international public. Concurrently, the conservative leadership was 
spreading propagandistic messages claiming the protests were being encouraged by 
outside enemies (Fathi, 2010).
In this context, people who had the necessary access and know-how turned to new 
media to build networks, coordinate protests, spread information, and seek external 
support. Emphasizing that the protests in Tehran were facilitated by blogs, Twitter, and 
Facebook, international media quickly rebranded the popular revolt a “Twitter 
Revolution,” with the media asking: “[h]ow did we have revolutions before Twitter?” 
(Segan, 2009). Some political analysts, following National Journal White House cor-
respondent Marc Ambinder’s lead, also cast Twitter as a “protagonal technology that 
enabled the powerless to survive a brutal crackdown and information blackout by the 
ruling authorities” (Ambinder, 2009). Former US National Security Adviser Mark 
Pfeifle stated that Twitter should get the Nobel Peace Prize, because “without Twitter, 
the people of Iran would not have felt empowered and confident to stand up for freedom 
and democracy” (in Esfandiari, 2010). The US State Department even reportedly asked 
Twitter to delay scheduled maintenance to allow Iranians to communicate (Pleming, 
2009).
Various factors contributed to making new media an effective tool for activists in Iran, 
where the median age is 26 and about half of the population is under the age of 35. 
Cellphone use is widespread, with nearly 100% of the population using them (Iran 
Telecommunications Report, 2012). Moreover, the number of Internet users has been 
increasing. In 2000, Iran had fewer than one million users; in 2010, over 43% of Iran’s 
estimated 75 million population used the Internet (Internet World Stats - Usage and 
Population Statistics, 2011), and between 43% (BBG/Gallup, 2012) and 47% (Wojcieszak 
et al., 2012) reported having Internet access at home in 2012. The Iranian blogosphere is 
among the fastest growing in the Middle East, and—with more than 700,000 active 
blogs—Persian is the second most used language in the blogosphere (Baavur-Hendelman, 
2007; Bucar and Fazaeli, 2008; Kelly and Etling, 2008; Sreberny and Khiabany, 2007). 
Furthermore, the government’s pervasive censorship of the media has given people addi-
tional incentive to turn to the Internet for news and information.
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Were new media protagonists of the post-election uprisings in Iran? Empirical data 
are limited, yet some evidence suggests that blogs, Twitter, and social networking made 
a significant difference. Using social network mapping and content analysis, Kelly and 
Etling (2008) demonstrate that one year before the election, many reformist Iranian 
bloggers engaged in contentious exchanges with pro-regime bloggers and published 
oppositional discourse online, despite the repressive environment. Relying on observa-
tions or interviews after the election, scholars also show that videos of demonstrations 
and police brutality that were posted by protesters and later picked up by Western media 
helped stimulate international support for the Green Movement (Rahimi, 2011), and that 
social networking sites gave rise to an “exponential expansion of the public domain into 
cyberspace, to the point that it has had a catalytic, and arguably overwhelming, effect on 
physical space” (Dabashi, 2010: 135). A correspondent for Al Jazeera English also noted 
that “[d]espite restrictions on access to Facebook … around 700,000 users were active 
from February 2008 to June 2009 … [and] the BBC says it was receiving around eight 
videos a minute at the height of the 2009 unrest” (Moshiri, 2011: 30).
Focusing on the 2011 uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, which share similarities with 
the events in Iran, Howard et al. (2011) show that social media played a central role in 
shaping political debates and that increased discussions about democracy and civil 
rights on Twitter, Facebook, or YouTube often preceded street protests. The authors 
argue that young, urban, and well-educated citizens employed new media to pressure 
governments, strategize the best courses of action, and create a “freedom meme” that 
could “spread ideas about liberty and revolution” to other activists and to international 
media (Howard et al, 2011: 3). As Howard and Hussain (2011: 36) conclude, “[d]igital 
media became the tool that allowed social movements to reach once-unachievable 
goals.”
However, many scholars, including those who offer the above evidence, criticize the 
temptation to attribute instigation of these events to new media as simplistic. Radio Free 
Europe journalist Golnaz Esfandiari notes, “[s]imply put: There was no Twitter 
Revolution inside Iran” (2010: 1). Even the manager of Balatarin, a popular Persian-
language website, was quoted as saying that was “lots of buzz” in the US regarding 
Twitter’s role in Iran, yet “once you look, you see most of it is Americans tweeting 
among themselves” (in Musgrove, 2009). Also, as protests escalated and the media 
attributed the coordination of the uprisings to social media, the Iranian government 
increased filtering of websites, slowed Internet speeds, detained bloggers and reporters, 
and tapped cellphones (Morozov, 2011). Hence, the election also revealed that using 
“social media by antigovernment activists, combined with access to highly sophisticated 
monitoring hardware and software on the part of the Iranian authorities, served to ration-
alize processes of state surveillance and repression” (Christensen, 2011: 155).
Despite the time that has passed since the Iranian election in June 2009, it is still per-
tinent to assess media use patterns among Iranian youth. Iran continues to be a volatile 
country with domestic discontent due to sanctions and dissatisfaction with sociopolitical 
conditions. Demonstrations break out periodically and are put down by the regime with 
ruthless efficiency, following the lessons learned in 2009 (Bozorgmehr et al., 2012). 
The country is currently gearing up for the presidential election in June 2013, which will 
be a heady period ripe with significance and intense political debate. In this context, the 
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Iranian government is on what can be described as permanent high alert against chal-
lenges to its authority. Since 2009, the state has further strengthened its control over the 
media: dozens of newspapers have been shut down and hundreds of journalists, intel-
lectuals, and political dissidents have been exiled or imprisoned. Internet filtering and 
monitoring of content considered politically or culturally sensitive has become a major 
government initiative, as has slowing Internet speeds to impede access (Saminejad, 
2011).1 Reporters without Borders calls Iran the “largest prison for journalists” (2010), 
and Freedom House (2012) ranks Iran last among the 47 countries assessed in relation to 
Internet freedom.
In this politically-charged context, little is known about patterns of media use among 
educated, metropolitan, and technologically savvy Iranian youth, the demographic 
which has proven to be the most active in the region’s political upheaval (see LaGraffe, 
2012). What sources and platforms do these youth use for information? Do they rely on 
new media platforms for political exchanges? Evidence about how youth respond to 
online censorship is yet more limited due to the sensitive nature of the issue (i.e., cir-
cumvention tools are illegal in Iran). It is not known how often young Iranians encoun-
ter blocked websites and use tools to circumvent filtering, or whether those who use 
new media for political purposes encounter filtered content more often (which could 
indicate their attempts to access sensitive material).
When addressing these issues, it is crucial to locate new media use in the larger con-
text of social capital. While theorizing about these issues in Iran is limited, some observ-
ers have noted that analyzing communication flows without attending to the social fabric 
“is to ignore traditional organizational and group channels which are peculiar to a 
region’s culture” (Mowlana, 1979: 111). In Iran, these channels include mosques and 
bazaars, where “opinions are formed and from which rumors are spread over wide areas 
with almost incomprehensible speed” (Mowlana, 1979: 109). Yet, as Howard (2010: 
152) notes, “political communication in many Muslim countries is very different from 
that of even a few years ago,” with the Internet strengthening existing groups and allow-
ing people to bridge communities and form new ties. Perhaps, therefore, those Iranian 
youth who rely on interpersonal networks and public spaces for information are also 
those who increasingly turn to new media to share it.
In order to address these important and understudied issues and offer a nuanced por-
trayal of the interactions between new and traditional communication channels in Iran, 
we surveyed Iranian youth at a point when the political atmosphere was particularly 
charged: in 2011, with popular uprisings spreading across the Middle East and North 
Africa and smaller-scale protests and demonstrations still popping up in Iran. We use 
these data to address four progressively specific research questions, as follows: What 
information sources are most important for technologically savvy Iranian youth and to 
what extent do these youth rely on social network sites, blogs, Twitter, and text messages 
versus friends, family, acquaintances, and mosques, among others (RQ1)? What topics 
do the respondents communicate about via new media (RQ2)? How pervasive is the 
censorship these youth encounter when using the Internet and what factors predict 
encountering blocked websites (RQ3)? Lastly, do young Iranians feel that new media 
enhance their political self-efficacy, two years after the Green Movement and during the 
ongoing protests in the region (RQ4)?
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Method
Data for this analysis come from an online survey targeting Iranian youth. The link to 
the Persian-language survey was included on a file-sharing platform (www.4shared.
com) which is the 20th most visited site in Iran (www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/IR). 
4shared, which is not filtered in Iran, recognizes its popularity in the country and pro-
vides full functionality in Persian. 4shared users can create collections of files which 
are searchable in Google, effectively making it a huge database of easily searchable 
content. eBooks in the Persian language, especially those banned inside Iran, are the 
most popular items.
The link to the survey was promoted via a banner on 4shared, and we offered file stor-
age credit as an incentive to participate. The link was active between March and late April 
2011. Overall, 2802 respondents completed the questionnaire.2 The sample, by nature of 
the recruiting platform, is young and technologically savvy. More than 80% of the 
respondents are under 30 (14% 18–20, 39% 21–25, and 27% 26–30). A solid majority 
(92%) is male, perhaps reflecting a gender gap in use of the Internet to share content.3 
Respondents are highly educated, with the majority (78%) having some type of university 
degree and almost 20% having an MA or PhD. They come from Tehran province (37%), 
Fars (11%), and Esfahan (8%), with other provinces being less represented.
Measures
Information sources. Respondents were asked where they usually turn for news on poli-
tics and current events. The questionnaire provided 12 options (friends and family; 
neighbors or acquaintances; government officials; taxis; shops and cafes; mosque and 
religious leaders; print media/newspapers; television; radio; Internet; SMS text mes-
sages; and work or school), and respondents could check all options that applied. A fol-
low-up question asked the respondents to select, from the sources indicated, the three 
most important.
New media use. The survey contained detailed questions about new media. Regarding 
social networks, respondents were asked whether they have an account on a social net-
working site, such as Facebook or Cloob (68% did). Regarding online blogs, respondents 
reported whether they use the Internet to read web-blogs (92%), write comments on blogs 
written by others (70%) and write their own blog (54%). Regarding Twitter, we asked 
whether, in the past month, respondents had used Twitter to share updates, to see updates 
about others, or for other activities. Those who had (17%) were asked how frequently 
they used it (1=“Less than once a month,” 2=“About once a month,” 3=“About every two 
weeks,” 4=“About once a week,” 5=“Several times a week but not every day,” 6=“Every 
day,” 7=“Several times a day;” M=3.22, SD=2.06). We also asked when respondents had 
started using Twitter (1=“less than six months ago,” 2=“about a year ago,” 3=“about two 
years ago,” 4=“about three years ago,” 5=“more than three years ago;” M=2.47, SD=1.40).
Mobile phone use. Respondents were asked whether they have a mobile phone; those 
who did (96%) were asked if they had used it to send or receive text messages in the 
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past month. The 99% who responded in the affirmative were probed about the 
frequency with which they texted (from 0 “Never” to 7 “Several times a day;” M=6.01, 
SD=1.32).
Communication topics. Those who belonged to a social network, read, commented on or 
wrote blogs, and/or sent or received tweets and text messages were presented with a list 
of issues (news and current events; foreign affairs; economy; neighborhood or commu-
nity; environment; women’s rights/gender; lifestyle; personal and everyday life issues; 
school, work or professional issues; sports; culture; religion; health; social issues; and 
also science/technology/IT), and asked to check all those they had communicated about 
over each tested platform during the last month.4
Circumvention tools. The survey contained several items about circumvention tools. 
Respondents were asked how often they came across filtered/blocked websites while 
using the Internet (0=Never,” 1=“Rarely,” 2=“Sometimes,” 3=“Often,” 4=“Always;” 
M=2.90, SD=1.70). The survey probed further, using non-specific language so as not to 
disincentivize responding: “Some people use various online tools that help circumvent 
blocked websites. Have you ever heard about such tools?” Those who had (79%) were 
asked how easy it would be for them to find and access these circumvention tools 
(1=“Nearly impossible,” 2=“Very difficult,” 3=“Difficult,” 4=“Easy,” and 5=“Very 
easy;” M=3.49, SD=.95) and how secure they would feel using them (1=“Very insecure,” 
2=“Insecure,” 3=“Neither secure nor insecure,” 4=“Secure,” 5=“Very secure;” M=2.67, 
SD=1.03). Respondents also rated their ability to use such tools (1=“Bad,” 2=“Poor,” 
3=“Fair,” 4=“Good,” 5=“Excellent;” M =3.66, SD=.97).
Political efficacy. We assessed whether respondents thought that new media make citizens 
efficacious. The survey stated: “Some people think that new media technologies (e.g., 
Internet, Twitter, mobile phones) will change the way people influence politics, while 
others think that this is not the case.” Respondents then aligned themselves, from “Disa-
gree Strongly” (1) to “Agree Strongly” (5), with the claim that through new media, “Peo-
ple like me can better understand government and politics” (internal efficacy, M=3.80, 
SD=1.04) and “Public officials will pay more attention to what people like me have to 
say” (external efficacy, M=3.13, SD=1.12).
Results
Information sources
The survey had four overarching purposes. We assessed where respondents turn for 
information about politics and current events by providing options ranging from friends 
and family to shops and cafes and traditional media. Because we sampled Internet users, 
it is not surprising that we found most of the respondents turn to the Internet for news 
(89%). Television was the second most often selected source (70%), followed by friends 
and family (49%), print media (42%), and work or school (33%). Despite the fact that 
our sample was young, well educated, and mostly based in metropolitan areas, character-
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istics generally construed by the media as typical of secular Iranians, government offi-
cials and religious leaders were also valued sources (18% and 10% respectively).5
When asked to provide a list of their three most important sources, 56% of respond-
ents selected the Internet as their first choice, 24% chose TV, and 7% chose friends and 
family. TV was most often selected as the second most important source (31%), followed 
by the Internet (21.5%) and friends and family (14%), who were selected as the third 
most important source by 19% (followed by the press, 16%, and TV, 14%). To examine 
the overall importance of these outlets, we created a variable that assigns value 1 each 
time a respondent selected a particular source among their three most important. The 
Internet clearly emerges as the central source for news and information (85%), followed 
by television (67%) and friends and family (39%).
We also asked about specific outlets used. Among those for whom the Internet fea-
tured in their top three sources, 38% selected BBC Persian’s website, filtered in Iran, as 
most important, followed by Tabnak (27%, not filtered) and Balatarin (25%, filtered). 
Somewhat surprisingly, among those for whom TV was among the three most important 
sources, the most popular outlet was the state-run and state-owned IRIB network 
(selected as most important by 62%), followed by BBC Persian (55%) and Voice of 
America Persian Network News (30%).
What about online activities? More respondents reported reading blogs (92%) and 
commenting on blogs (70%) than belonging to social networks (68%). This might indi-
cate a vibrant online blogosphere, especially considering that more than half of our 
respondents (54%) wrote their own blog, even if these blogs were not updated frequently. 
Among the bloggers, 40.5% reported updating their blog less than once a month, 17.5% 
about once a month, and only 8% every day or more.
Despite the central role that Twitter was said to play in the uprisings in Iran, it was the 
least prevalent new media platform used by our sample. Only 17% reported using Twitter 
to share or follow tweets. Among the users, most had joined in the past six months 
(34.5%), 21% had started using Twitter about a year previously and only 22% had started 
two years previously, coinciding with the contested election. In relation to frequency of 
use, 33% shared or followed tweets about once a month, 11% used Twitter every day, and 
7% used it several times a day.
Cellphones were also credited with fomenting social unrest after the election and cor-
respondents in Tehran reported that the government was preventing access to the cell-
phone network, attesting to its crucial role (Robinson, 2009). Most respondents (96%) 
had cellphones, and nearly all of those (99%) had used their phone to send messages in 
the past month (50% texted several times a day, 21.5% at least once a day and 20% sev-
eral times a week, but not every day).
Discussed topics
To assess the political potential of new media, it is not sufficient simply to analyze 
whether people are using various platforms; it is also essential to examine the issues that 
users communicate about. Political issues did not top the agenda. Respondents did talk 
about news and current events (44%), foreign affairs (32%), community (25%), and the 
economy (21%) on social networks; however, these issues were less prevalent than 
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personal topics, which were discussed by 54% of our respondents. Pressing social issues, 
such as the environment (11%) or women’s rights (10%), were less often addressed in 
social networks.
Politics was yet less common in the blogosphere. As Table 1 shows, even though the 
respondents read blogs about news and current events, foreign affairs or the economy, 
these topics were far less popular when it came to commenting or posting in the blogo-
sphere. Also, politics was less popular than science/IT, with respondents most often 
addressing science-oriented issues when commenting on and writing their own blogs. 
Work-related and social topics were also among the most popular in the blogosphere.
Amongst those who tweeted, news and current events, (selected by 40% of Twitter 
users), science/IT issues (38%) and personal topics (38%) were equally important. With 
regard to text messages, unsurprisingly, personal topics emerged as the most prevalent 
subject (76%), followed by work (41%) and social issues (21%).
Who was most likely to talk about politics via the platforms analyzed? For each plat-
form (social networks, blogs, Twitter, and text messages), we created a measure indicat-
ing communication about strictly political issues (i.e., news/current events and foreign 
affairs) and predicted it from socio-demographics, being based in Tehran province, hav-
ing broadband access, dummy variables indicating that a respondent selected a given 
information source among the three most important, and the two items tapping political 
efficacy.6
As Table 2 shows, older respondents were more likely than their younger counterparts 
to discuss news and foreign affairs via Twitter. Also, males read and wrote political blogs 
more often than females. Education was only related to reading political blogs. Having 
Table 1. Percentage of respondents discussing the various issues through new media.
Social 
networks
Blogs—read Blogs—
comment
Blogs—write Twitter SMS
Community 25.3% 22.2% 13.9% 9.0% 19.3% 16.2%
News 43.8% 44.2% 30.5% 16.6% 40.0% 15.0%
Foreign Affairs 31.8% 31.3% 17.4% 9.5% 28.4% 5.0%
Environment 10.9% 10.5% 5.7% 4.0% 6.1% 1.9%
Economy 19.7% 22.8% 12.1% 7.7% 15.7% 7.3%
Sport 27.3% 29.2% 17.9% 9.8% 18.6% 11.5%
Culture 30.9% 37.0% 28.6% 27.0% 24.6% 16.7%
Social 39.3% 40.7% 31.9% 24.8% 21.1%
Religion 11.3% 20.8% 14.4% 14.4% 8.3% 11.9%
Health 13.2% 21.6% 8.0% 6.5% 7.4% 4.0%
Personal 53.8% 31.6% 29.2% 32.7% 37.5% 75.7%
Work 31.9% 43.5% 30.1% 27.7% 24.2% 40.6%
Science 45.8% 61.7% 44.4% 39.1% 37.7% 13.1%
Gender 9.7% 10.2% 6.4% 3.2% 9.3% 2.1%
Note: Percentages do not add up to 100% because respondents could select more than one category.
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broadband access was also not a consistent predictor: it was associated with political talk 
on social networks and—marginally—with blogging about politics. In addition, those 
respondents who thought that new media make it easier for people to understand politics 
were more likely than others to discuss politics on social networks, read and comment on 
political blogs, and share politics via Twitter and text messages. Interestingly, although 
those who believed that new media can make public officials more attentive could be 
expected to be more vocal about politics online, political efficacy only predicted political 
talk via social networks and text messages.
Did the extent to which these youth communicated about politics depend on where 
they turned for news and current events? In other words, did any particular outlet stimu-
late political use of new media? Selecting friends and family among the three most 
important sources was positively related to talking politics on online social networks. In 
contrast, relying on “weaker ties” such as neighbors, acquaintances and people at work/
school, as well as on taxis, shops, or cafes, was generally unrelated to talking politics via 
new media.
Did traditional media matter? Not among these respondents. As Table 2 shows, select-
ing traditional media among the three most important news sources was unrelated to 
political talk. If anything, the negative coefficients suggest that those who relied on print, 
TV, and radio talked politics on social networks less than those who ranked these outlets 
as less important.
Further, although one would expect that using the Internet for news would be related 
to communicating about politics via new media, it only predicted political exchanges on 
social networks, and blogs (reading only).7 In turn, those who used text messages for 
information also talked politics on social networks and—naturally—via text.
Circumvention tools
Our third research question considered circumvention tools—a sensitive topic which we 
had to address hypothetically. A majority of our respondents (71%) reported that they 
either often (38%) or always (33%) found it difficult to access content on the Web and 
encountered blocked websites. Similarly, a majority (79%) had heard about tools that 
help circumvent blocked websites. Among those, 51.5% said it would be either easy 
(37.5%) or very easy (14%) to find and access such tools, but many would not feel secure 
using them (15% “very insecure” and 26% “insecure”). When asked to rate their ability 
to use circumvention tools, most respondents rated it as fair (34.4%), good (34%), or 
excellent (22%).
Do those who come across blocked websites use new media for different purposes 
than those who do not? Regression models predicted the frequency of encountering 
blocked sites from socio-demographics, broadband access, being based in Tehran, and 
various new media use patterns (social networks, blogs, text messages, and Twitter). 
Those respondents who used social networks, Twitter, and text messages reported com-
ing across blocked websites more often than those who did not use these platforms.8
Who was more likely to express facility with finding and comfort and ability in using 
circumvention tools? As Table 3 shows, older users reported a lower ability to use such 
tools, a pattern generally reversed among males, those in the Tehran area, and those with 
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broadband access. Telling results emerged when it came to new media use. Those who 
used social networks and commented on blogs felt greater facility accessing circumven-
tion tools than their counterparts who did not use these platforms. Also, those who used 
social networks, who used Twitter, and who wrote and commented on blogs had a higher 
ability to use circumvention tools.
Perhaps it was the topics that made some users more likely to encounter blocked con-
tent and approach circumvention tools in certain ways? To examine this possibility we 
retested the above models, entering—in place of the new media platforms—dummy 
variables representing talking about political issues via the analyzed platforms. With 
regard to encountering blocked websites, reading political blogs was the only marginal 
predictor (b=.08, p < .10), and the other political activities in the “new media sphere” 
were unrelated (R2=5%, n=201). Also, only males (b=.73, p < .01) and those who texted 
about politics (b=.42, p < .10) said it would be easy to access circumvention tools. In 
contrast, commenting on political blogs was a negative predictor (b=−.45, p < .05, 
R2=11%, n=193). The tested items were also unrelated to the security of using circum-
vention tools (R2=5%, n=193). Lastly, those who commented on political blogs felt less 
able to use circumvention tools than those who did not engage with such blogs (b=-.41, 
p < .05) and males deemed themselves more proficient at using such tools than females 
(b=.68, p < .01; R2=9%, n=190).9
Political efficacy
Lastly, we assessed whether—two years after the election and during the upheavals 
across the region—Iranian youth thought that new media could change the way people 
Table 3. Predicting circumvention tools measures.
Encountering 
blocked websites 
(n=2474)
Facility Finding 
(n=2052)
Security Using 
(n=2052)
Ability to use 
(n=1990)
Age 0.01 (0.02) −0.03 (0.02) −0.00 (0.02) −0.07*** (0.02)
Gender −0.12 (0.07) 0.23** (0.08) −0.08 (0.09) 0.56*** (0.08)
Education −0.01 (0.03) −0.03 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) 0.05† (0.03)
Teheran Province 0.06 (0.04) 0.10* (0.04) 0.09† (0.05) 0.04 (0.04)
Broadband access −0.06 (0.05) 0.17** (0.05) 0.04 (0.06) 0.10† (0.05)
Social network use 0.35*** (0.05) 0.12* (0.05) 0.07 (0.06) 0.35*** (0.05)
Blogs—Reading 0.09 (1.02) 0.57 (0.94) −0.33 (1.03) 0.71 (0.93)
Blogs—
Commenting
0.00 (0.05) 0.14** (0.05) 0.06 (0.06) 0.19*** (0.05)
Blogs—Writing −0.06 (0.05) 0.01 (0.05) 0.04 (0.05) 0.11* (0.05)
Twitter use 0.13* (0.05) −0.02 (0.05) 0.01 (0.06) 0.20*** (0.05)
Text message use 0.03* (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) −0.01 (0.02) −0.01 (0.02)
R2 (%) 4% 3% 1% 9%
Note: *** p≤ 0.001 ** p≤ .01 * p≤ .05, † p≤ .10; Entries are unstandardized coefficients with standard errors 
in parentheses.
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influence politics. In general, respondents were more confident that new media could 
increase people’s political understanding (internal efficacy) than that public officials 
would be more attentive to the citizenry (external efficacy; M=3.80 vs. M=3.13, p < 
.001). To identify those who felt greater efficacy, we predicted the two items from the 
aforementioned controls, the most important news sources, new media use patterns, and 
the items related to online censorship and circumvention tools.
As Table 4 shows, in both models, older and better educated respondents and those for 
whom the Internet was among the three most important news sources expressed greater 
political efficacy. In contrast, those who relied on neighbors or acquaintances for 
Table 4. Predicting political efficacy from new media use patterns.
Internal efficacy (n=1982) External efficacy (n=1982)
Age 0.09*** (0.02) 0.06** (0.02)
Gender 0.10 (0.08) 0.15 (0.10)
Education 0.06* (0.03) 0.06† (0.04)
Teheran Province 0.08† (0.04) −0.09† (0.05)
Broadband access 0.07 (0.05) −0.04 (0.06)
Most important source  
Friends/Family 0.02 (0.06) −0.01 (0.07)
Neighbors/acquaintances −0.20* (0.10) −0.19† (0.11)
Government officials −0.14 (0.09) 0.13 (0.11)
Taxis −0.06 (0.11) −0.08 (0.13)
Shops and cafes 0.02 (0.31) −0.60 (0.38)
Mosque/religious leaders −0.27* (0.12) 0.00 (0.15)
Print −0.01 (0.06) 0.04 (0.07)
Television −0.08 (0.05) 0.07 (0.06)
Radio −0.09 (0.08) 0.20** (0.10)
Internet 0.37*** (0.08) 0.31** (0.10)
Text messages −0.07 (0.14) −0.04 (0.17)
Work/school −0.05 (0.06) 0.10 (0.07)
New media use  
Social network use 0.13* (0.05) −0.01 (0.06)
Blogs—Reading −0.04 (0.93) −0.04 (1.12)
Blogs—Commenting 0.13* (0.05) 0.02 (0.06)
Blogs—Writing −0.08† (0.05) −0.04 (0.06)
Twitter use 0.07 (0.05) 0.16* (0.06)
Text message use 0.04* (0.02) 0.02 (0.03)
Online censorship  
Encountering blocked sites 0.08*** (0.02) 0.01 (0.03)
Circumvention tools—Facility −0.03 (0.02) 0.00 (0.03)
Circumvention tools—Security 0.01 (0.02) −0.00 (0.03)
Circumvention tools—Ability 0.09*** (0.02) −0.00 (0.03)
R2 (%) 10% 3%
Note: *** p≤ 0.001 ** p≤ .01 * p≤ .05, † p≤ .10; Entries are unstandardized coefficients with standard errors 
in parentheses.
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information were less confident. In addition, the first column shows that social networking, 
commenting on blogs, and sending texts positively predicted internal efficacy, whereas 
relying on religious leaders for news was negatively related. With regard to censorship, 
respondents who often encountered blocked websites and those skilled at using circumven-
tion tools agreed that new media help people to understand politics more than those who 
rarely came across blocked content and did not report having the skills to circumvent 
blocked pages. As the second column shows, selecting radio among the most important 
news sources and using Twitter were positively related to external efficacy, and the other 
new media variables did not matter.
As above, two final models predicted the two efficacy items from whether respond-
ents discussed politics via new media, socio-demographics and the online censorship 
items. Those who talked politics on social networks expressed greater confidence that 
new media increased understanding than those who did not use social networks for 
politics (b=.40, p < .05), and this was the only significant new media predictor in both 
models. The censorship-related variables also did not matter (only the ability to use 
circumvention tools was marginally significant; b=.13, p <.10). Lastly, it was again the 
educated respondents who felt more efficacious (internal, b=.41, p < .001, external 
b=.20, p <.10, n=220, R2=16% and 11% respectively).
Discussion
When an election is over, new media habits remain. Elections have become sensitive moments 
in which student leaders, journalists, and civil society groups experiment with digital 
technologies. Even if their preferred candidates are not elected, the process of experimentation 
is important because, by using digital media, citizens construct an information infrastructure 
that is largely independent of the state. Digital media leave a lasting imprint on civil society, 
one that continues after elections. The Internet allows youth to learn, for instance, about life in 
countries where faith and freedom coexist (Howard, 2010).
Following Howard (2010), it might be suggested that new media should continue to 
be relied upon for political exchanges and social organizing in Iran. This is especially so 
because the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011 also suggested that 
Twitter and Facebook have the potential to instigate, organize, or at least report on socio-
political change. Most certainly, this role was occasionally overstated, with some media 
critics, civil society advocates, and the public talking about alleged “new media revolu-
tions.” We contributed to this debate by studying technologically savvy Iranian youth 
over a year after the election and during the uprisings in the region. We examined their 
information sources, the topics they discussed via new media, their experiences with 
online censorship and circumvention tools, and also the beliefs they held about new 
media’s ability to influence the political process.
Our results offer several notable patterns. First, the Internet was the most important 
news outlet for our sample. Television—especially the state broadcaster—was the sec-
ond most often used source. This finding is surprising because the surveyed youth map 
well on to the collective profile of reformist activists who would distrust the govern-
ment and its sources, suggesting perhaps that this young population is not uniformly 
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politicized, mistrustful, or primed for protest, and that despite the fact that the state 
broadcaster is a mouthpiece for the regime, these young Iranians still watch its 
content.
Second, despite the claims that Twitter played a central role in the uprisings and the 
fact that 90% of Iranian Twitter users live in Tehran, Twitter was the least prevalent new 
media platform. Our data cannot speak to the extent to which it was employed directly 
after the contested election. As media use is context-specific, perhaps this very sample 
would have been tweeting in higher numbers had they been sampled two years prior or 
during a similar major upheaval. This finding may nevertheless suggest that the central 
role played by Twitter was overstated. Some analysts allude to this possibility, noting 
that “if we look at all the [political] movements […] many of the key players have now 
left the country” (Valadbaygi, in Esfandiari, 2011: 23) and that “Oxfordgirl [Tweeting in 
English from outside Iran] was ultimately more successful at gaining publicity for her-
self than at helping any protesters in Iran” (Esfandiari, 2010).10
Our third noteworthy finding is the extent to which these youth use new media tech-
nologies for politics. We find that—at least in 2011—politics was not topping the agenda 
in the “new media sphere.” Again, although new media use habits could have been dif-
ferent during the election, the detected patterns are telling. They suggest that mobiliza-
tion via new media did not continue and/or was not substantial to begin with, and that our 
sample was more interested in using blogs, text messages, or Twitter to communicate 
about personal topics, new technologies and work-related affairs than politics. Reports 
on mobilization among Iranian youth in 2009, coupled with the popular uprisings in the 
region at the time the survey was conducted, could lead observers to expect higher politi-
cization on the various new media platforms, but our results indicate that the medium is 
not always the message.
Speaking to the importance of social capital in twenty-first century Iran, we find that 
friends and family were not only important information sources, but also that those 
respondents who talked about politics with their “strong ties” were those who use online 
social networks for politics. In contrast, acquaintances, coffeehouses, streets, or the mar-
ketplace were not used for news, and neither did these weaker ties and the larger public 
sphere stimulate political exchanges via the new media we analyzed. These telling dif-
ferences place new media use and the public sphere in context, and substantially extend 
what is known about information flows in Iran. These findings may suggest that public 
places are an increasingly uneasy space for information gathering and exchange due to 
controls on public space and public behavior, related in part to the tense political situa-
tion as well as to the culture of guarded behavior in public, which leads the majority of 
young Iranians to turn to trusted strong ties for political exchanges. These findings also 
confirm Howard’s (2010) observation that the meaning and performance of citizenship 
has changed with the advent and proliferation of new media.
Two other patterns merit mention. Encountering blocked content online is related 
more to what new media platforms one uses than to whether one discusses politics online. 
In line with our other findings, this suggests that talking politics via new media is not 
necessarily synonymous with accessing and discussing subversive content and that our 
sample is not uniformly opposed to the regime. Similarly, it is use of some of the tested 
platforms, and not talking politics, that is related to political efficacy, with the possible 
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conclusion that for this sample, using new media per se may be more politically conse-
quential than its actual content.
Taken together, our findings could align with those voices that cast doubts on the 
extent to which new media swept in the wave of discontent that followed the 2009 presi-
dential election, and the extent to which they have the ability to fuel activist protest and 
sustain revolution.
However, our results add another layer to our understanding of new media and poli-
tics in Iran, underscoring the fact that access to information is inherently political. Our 
sample often turns to Balatarin and BBC Persian (websites that are filtered and that can 
only be accessed when one uses illegal circumvention tools) and expresses greater 
familiarity with and comfort using circumvention tools than does the general Iranian 
population (Wojcieszak et al., 2012). For these youth, using the Internet is a political act 
in and of itself, a routine “rebellion” that, while not necessarily overtly challenging the 
regime, thumbs its nose at attempts to limit information access. As Howard (2010: 
164–165) notes, online censorship has essentially politicized various cultural and com-
municative practices, in that blocking access to Facebook or blogging applications 
“enrages users, generates some international press coverage, and transforms the online 
social networking software used by high school students and the most innocuous blogs 
into resistant political culture.”
Also, the people who turn to these filtered websites are the same ones who use social 
networks, Twitter, blogs, and text messages to discuss politics, and Twitter users, although 
not numerous, feel that new media may impact government responsiveness to the popu-
lace. This finding reveals persisting nodes of plugged-in Iranians. Focusing on such 
hubs—as many scholars have done—can lead one to overestimate the role played by new 
media in authoritarian regimes. Our study, broader in scope, may thus more accurately 
portray the complex interplay between citizens, media, and political powers—an interplay 
in which not all who are active are uniformly politicized against the regime, where some 
prefer to be bystanders or passive observers, and where still others foment revolution.
Inasmuch as debates surrounding the role of social media during the Arab Spring 
“find their genesis in the events that took place in Iran during the summer of 2009” 
(Christensen, 2011: 155), our study may inform these other cases, showing that in other 
unstable, wired, and continually politicized contexts and among other educated, metro-
politan, and technologically savvy youth, “the heyday of revolutionary activism will 
pass; everyday life will return, and Internet use will become less ‘revolutionary’” 
(Hofheinz, 2011: 1427). Our hope is that this study will encourage communication and 
political science scholars to look broadly for evidence on new media’s role in political 
organizing, and to contextualize this role in the larger fabric of social life. It is studies 
that attend to the nuanced way in which interpersonal, cultural, and structural factors 
constitute information flows that can best avoid the tendency to mythologize youth in 
undemocratic societies and the technologically deterministic narratives where social 
movements are synonymous with social media.
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Notes
 1. The Law of Cyber Crimes, approved by Iran’s parliament in 2009, is used to prosecute activ-
ists and bloggers. The law establishes a range of restrictions on online content, including 
materials deemed immoral, or anti-Islamic, or that “agitate […] the opinion of the public, or 
of the official authorities.”
 2. The response rate cannot be completed because it is not possible to determine how many 
people were exposed to the link during the recruitment period.
 3. Some studies suggest that there is a gender gap in Internet usage (Bastani and Fazel-Zarandi, 
2008). Women also may be more likely to be underrepresented in some online platforms. 
About 80% of participants in online networks such as DarsNameh are male and practitioners 
confirm that there is a gender gap online in Iran, particularly when it comes to more advanced 
technologies (communication with Small Media Consultancy, a research and advocacy group 
focusing on Iran).
 4. Response options were designed with consultancy from a network of Iranian scholars and 
activists familiar with the Iranian information ecology. We also incorporated evidence on 
the topics discussed in the Iranian blogosphere (e.g., Berkman Center Workshop on Iranian 
Blogosphere, 2007). The translated questionnaire was also pretested and modified as 
necessary.
 5. Submitting all the sources to factor analysis yielded three factors that point to different com-
munication patterns. Interpersonal talk with friends, family, neighbors, and acquaintances, 
at work or at school; discussions in such public spaces as taxis or in shops and cafes; and 
SMS use all loaded on one factor (social capital; Eigenvalue 2.61, variance explained 22%). 
More traditional or state-related sources such as the press, television, radio, and governmental 
officials and mosque or religious leaders constituted the second factor (state communica-
tion; Eigenvalue 1.42, additional variance 12%). Lastly, the Internet loaded on a separate 
factor (Eigenvalue 1.15, additional variance 10%). When analyzing these items, the Internet 
emerged as the most frequently selected source (89%), followed by the state-related channels 
(33%) and “social capital” communication (20%); the differences were significant.
 6. We also created items indicating broader sociopolitical issues (i.e., news/current events, for-
eign affairs, the economy, and gender/women’s rights). Models predicting such talk yielded 
parallel results, with some minor differences. Older respondents and females were more 
likely than their younger and male counterparts to discuss these broader issues on social 
networks. Also, there were marginally significant associations between turning to shops or 
cafes for information and talking about these topics on social networks, on blogs, and via text 
messages.
 7. We also re-ran our models, entering a dummy variable representing respondents who selected 
Balatarin (a blocked website associated with the reformist Green Movement) among the most 
important websites. Using Balatarin for information was positively related to talking politics 
via all the tested new media platforms.
 8. Because Twitter and Facebook are blocked in Iran, their use necessarily entails using circum-
vention tools. These associations may thus indicate that these users are accessing other sites 
that are blocked more frequently or that they encounter more blocked sites because the sites 
they intend to access are Twitter and Facebook.
 9. Additional models that did not include political communication via Twitter (increasing the 
sample size) found nearly identical coefficients.
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10. It is also possible that, fearing that their online communications were being monitored, some 
respondents did not answer some questions honestly, underreporting Twitter use. Because 
respondents freely admitted using Facebook and being familiar with circumvention tools, we 
have no reason to believe that the low usage of Twitter can be explained by this factor.
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